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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal decides whether Dale Carter Shackelford will spend the rest of his
life in prison, without any hope or chance of parole, despite a number of errors occurring
before and during his sentencing hearing.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
A jury found Dale Carter Shackelford guilty of two counts of first-degree murder,
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit firstdegree arson, and preparing false evidence. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 36162 (2010). Eight months later, the district court held a sentencing hearing. Id. at 362.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found the State had proven two
aggravating factors against Mr. Shackelford, and after weighing the cumulative
mitigation against each aggravator, the mitigation was not sufficiently compelling to
make the death penalty unjust, sentencing Mr. Shackelford to death for each firstdegree murder. Id.

In addition, Mr. Shackelford received the following sentences for

the non-homicide offenses: first-degree arson, 25 years fixed; conspiracy to commit
first-degree murder, fixed life; conspiracy to commit first-degree arson, 25 years fixed;
and preparing false evidence, 5 years fixed. (39398 Tr., p.65, Ls.13-24.) 1

1

The record from Mr. Shackelford's sentencing in 2011, in case 39398, consists of one
volume of a clerk's record, one volume of a transcript, one presentence investigation
report (PSI) from Mr. Shackelford's original sentencing, and an updated presentence
investigation report (UPSI). Citation to these documents will by page number. In
addition, because the district court explicitly relied on the prior proceedings in reaching
its sentencing decision, a motion for this Court to take judicial notice of the prior records
on appeal, including the clerk's records, transcripts, presentence investigation reports
and other exhibits from prior proceedings before this Court, is being filed simultaneously
with this brief.
1

Mr. Shackelford appealed from his convictions and filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-2719. Id. at 363. The district court
granted Mr. Shackelford sentencing relief after concluding that a jury, not a judge, must
conduct

the

weighing

of

mitigating

circumstances

against

each

aggravating

circumstance to comply with Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). As a result, the
district court set aside Mr. Shackelford's death sentences but denied all other claims
and deemed the remaining sentencing claims moot. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Shackelford's underlying
convictions and the district court's order setting aside Mr. Shackelford's sentences, but
on different grounds. Id. at 387-88. The Court concluded that the jury's verdicts finding
Mr. Shackelford guilty of two counts of first-degree murder in the same county on the
same date were insufficient to prove the aggravating circumstance that at the time one
murder was committed;

the defendant also committed

another murder.

Id.

Mr. Shackelford's case was remanded for resentencing pursuant to Idaho Code section
19-2515. Id. at 388.
On remand, the district court reappointed the same counsel who represented
Mr. Shackelford at the original trial and sentencing. (R.39398, p.10.) At a status review
hearing six weeks later, the prosecutor disclosed the State was still considering whether
it would seek the death penalty. (R.39398, p.12.) A month later, the State filed a notice
of its intent not to ask for death, and instead urged the court to impose two fixed life
sentences upon Mr. Shackelford. (R.39398, pp.14-20.)
When the State decided not to seek death and it was clear Judge Stegner would
be responsible for sentencing Mr. Shackelford, not a jury, Mr. Shackelford moved to
disqualify Judge Stegner, both with and without case. (R.39398, pp.23-24, 64-77.)
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Judge Stegner denied the motion to disqualify without cause, concluding because
Mr. Shackelford's case was remanded for resentencing, not a new trial, he had no right
to an automatic disqualification under Idaho Appellate Rule 25(a)(5). (R.39398, pp.2930.)

Judge Stegner also denied Mr. Shackelford's motion to disqualify for cause,

concluding he had no "actual prejudice against [Mr. Shackelford] of such a nature to
render it improbable that the Court carry out the sentencing in a fair and impartial
manner." (R.39398, p.97; 39398 Tr., p.26, L.10 - p.28, L.1.) Judge Stegner specifically
denied that his exposure to volumes of information about Mr. Shackelford, including
statements of Mr. Shackelford's co-defendants in their own cases which were not
subject to cross-examination by Mr. Shackelford, as well as privileged communications
between counsel and Mr. Shackelford, prejudiced him against Mr. Shackelford. (39398
Tr., p.26, L.17 - p.27, L.25.) Without objection, the court ordered the preparation of an
update to Mr. Shackelford's original presentence investigation report (PSI) and imposed
deadlines for objecting to the updated report. (R.39398 R., pp.34-35.)
Mr. Shackelford filed a response to the state's notice not to seek death,
specifically objecting to the State's request for two fixed life sentences. (R.39398, pp.3642.) Mr. Shackelford maintained he could only receive a fixed life sentence for firstdegree murder if a jury found a statutory aggravating circumstance but decided
mitigation made the death penalty unjust, or if the jury just could not agree whether the
mitigation made the death penalty unjust. (R.39398, p.38.) Otherwise, the only
permissible sentence for first-degree murder absent an aggravating circumstance is an
indeterminate life sentence with a fixed term of not less than ten (10) years. (R.39398,
pp.38-39.) The State responded that Idaho Code section 19-2515 had no application to
Mr. Shackelford's resentencing because the State was not seeking death. (R.39398,
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pp.46-47.) The State maintained sections 19-2513 and 18-4004 of Idaho Code permit a
sentencing court to impose a fixed period of confinement up to life imprisonment for
first-degree murder when death is not sought. (R.39398, pp.45-48.) In his sentencing
memorandum, Mr. Shackelford reiterated his argument that the court could only impose
an indeterminate life sentence with ten years fixed upon him for each count of firstdegree murder pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-4004 and Booth v. State, 151 Idaho
612 (2011), and asked the Court to impose that specific sentence. (R.39398, pp.99-116,
120-22.) The court rejected Mr. Shackelford's interpretations of Booth and section 184004, concluding the sentence for first-degree murder when death is not sought is
indeterminate life with a minimum of ten years, and it is within the court's discretion to
impose more than ten years fixed, including a fixed life sentence. (39398 Tr., p.35, L.14
- p.36, L.2.)
Mr. Shackelford then filed a written objection to the original PSI, the Updated PSI
(UPSI) and related attachments on a number of grounds, including relevance, reliability,
confrontation clause/Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) violations, and
improper victim impact evidence in violation of State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548 (2008).
(R.39398, pp.89-90.) Neither the State nor the court addressed Mr. Shackelford's
objections to the PSI and UPSI prior to sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing, the court asked if Mr. Shackelford wanted to rebut or
explain anything in the PSI or UPSI. (39398 Tr., p.36, Ls.3-20.) Mr. Shackelford rested
on his prior written objection, and then offered testimony from two witnesses: Idaho
Department of Correction (IDOC) officer Jerald Miller and IDOC Probation and Parole
officer Jackye Squire-Leonard. (39398 Tr., p.36, Ls.21-22; 39398 Tr., p.40, L.3 - p.41,
L.13 (Officer Miller); 39398 Tr., p.42, L.19-p.57, L.17 (Officer Squire-Leonard).) Officer
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Miller explained one of Mr. Shackelford's Disciplinary Offense Report (DOR) violations
as a misunderstanding, and Officer Squire-Leonard explained the purpose of a PSI,
who she spoke with in preparing Mr. Shackelford's PSI and UPSI, and what information
she relied on and included in both. (39398 Tr., p.40, L.3 - p.57, L.17.) Mr. Shackelford
then made an unsworn statement to the court explaining the three DOR violations he
had received from 2001to2010. (39398 Tr., p.58, L.14-p.63, L.13.)
After hearing argument from Mr. Shackelford's counsel and a brief statement
from Mr. Shackelford thanking his attorney, the court heard from the prosecutor. The
prosecutor reminded the court of Mr. Shackelford's other convictions and sentences,
referred the court to its original findings in support of the death penalty, noting the facts
the court considered in 2001 to sentence Mr. Shackelford to death had not changed.
(39398 Tr., p.65, L.8 - p.72, L.25; 27966 R., pp.3082-3115; 27966 Sentencing Tr., p.9,
L.5 - p.960, L.9.) The prosecutor emphasized the testimony and letters from Bernadette
Lasater, the letters from Martha Millar and Suzanne Ninichuck, Mr. Shackelford's prior
record, and his propensity to use women, to support his request that the Court impose
two fixed life sentences. (39398 Tr., p.67, L.19 - p.72, L.18; UPSI, attached letters from
Ms. Lasater, Ms. Ninichuck, and email from Ms. Millar; 27966 Sentencing Tr., p.265,
L.12 - p.407, L. 14 (Ms. Lasater testimony); 27966 Sentencing Tr., p.409, L.2 - p.469,
L.10 (Ms. Millar testimony);27966 Trial Tr., p.2918, L.24 - p.3238, L.21 (Ms. Millar
testimony); 27966 Trial Tr., p.3241, L.25 - p.3589, L.2 (Ms. Lasater testimony)).
The court acquiesced:

Having seen you in the way that I did, and heard the evidence
that I heard, and seen the presentence reports and all the
documentation that went along with that, I thought the death penalty
was the appropriate sentence in your case.
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But having found that the ultimate sanction was, or would
have been appropriate for the crimes that you committed, I don't
think it should come as any surprise that I'm imposing fixed life
sentences for the murders of Donna Fontaine and Fred Palahniuk.
My goal in sentencing, Mr. Shackelford, is that you not be released
into society again. And I am ordering that those sentences be served
consecutively. So, unless there be any confusion on the part of the
Department of Parole's point, I hope you don't get out again.
You are very bright. You are very charming. But you used your
intelligence and your charm in, as I characterized before, unspeakable
ways, and I therefore think that the fixed life sentence is the appropriate
sentence for you.
(39398 Tr., p.73, L.21 - p.74, L.23 (emphasis added); 27966 R., pp.3082-3115; 27966
Sentencing Tr.,

p.9,

L.5 -

p.960,

L.9 (2001

Mr. Shackelford timely appealed.
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Aggravation/mitigation

hearing.)

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to disqualify itself from
sentencing Mr. Shackelford

II.

Whether the district court erred in considering testimony not subject to
confrontation and cross-examination in sentencing Mr. Shackelford

Ill.

Whether the district court abused its discretion in considering offenses of which
Mr. Shackelford was acquitted in reaching its sentencing decision

IV.

Whether the district court abused its discretion in considering victim impact
evidence from a person who was not a victim of Mr. Shackelford's crimes

7

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Disqualify Itself From
Sentencing Mr. Shackelford

A.

Introduction
Mr. Shackelford asked the Honorable John Stegner, the judge who sentenced

him to die in 2001 for two counts of first-degree murder, be disqualified from sentencing
him again. Mr. Shackelford sought disqualification due to Judge Stegner's bias or
prejudice against him and his case, formed when the judge was exposed to a broad
range of inadmissible and unreliable evidence at the first sentencing that would not or
should not be admitted or considered at the resentencing. The district court denied the
motion to disqualify, finding it was not biased or prejudiced against Mr. Shackelford to a
degree that would render him unable to fairly and impartially conduct sentencing. For
the reasons explained below, the district court abused its discretion in denying
Mr. Shackelford's for cause disqualification motion.l.C.R. 25(b)
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Disqualify Itself From
Sentencing Mr. Shackelford
The district court's prior exposure to inadmissible, unreliable and prejudicial

information about Mr. Shackelford and his case rendered the court unable to fairly and
impartially sentence Mr. Shackelford for two counts of first-degree murder. A judge who
is biased or prejudiced for or against a party or the party's case is disqualified from
presiding in that case. Idaho Criminal Rule (l.C.R.) 25(b) provides a judge may be
disqualified from presiding in any action where the judge "is biased or prejudiced for or
against any party of that party's case in the action." Here, Judge Stegner's prior
exposure to prejudicial, unreliable and inadmissible information about Mr. Shackelford
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and his case, by both presiding over Mr. Shackelford's 2001 capital sentencing, as well
as the sentencings of Mr. Shackelford's co-defendants, prejudiced or biased Judge
Stegner to the extent he could not fairly and impartially perform the legal analysis to
sentence Mr. Shackelford in 2011.
A defendant's entitlement to a fair and impartial judge is a guarantee of
constitutional dimension. "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process ... ."In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Due process thus "entitles a
person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases."
Marshall v. Jerrica, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). When analyzing a judicial-bias claim
under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has held that the question is "not
whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his
position is 'likely' to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional 'potential for
bias."' Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009). Under this
approach, courts are instructed to make "a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness" even of judges who are otherwise rightly presumed
to be impartial. Id. at 883 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Only an
objective standard can provide "adequate protection against a judge who simply
misreads or misapprehends the real motives at work in deciding the case." Id.
The Due Process guarantee to a fair and impartial judge is memorialized in Idaho
Criminal Rule 25(b), which permits any party to disqualify a judge from presiding in any
action if the judge is biased or prejudiced for or against any party or that party's case. A
court's decision granting or denying a defendant's motion to disqualify based on bias or
prejudice under l.C.R. 25(b) is one of discretion. State v. Pratt, 128 Idaho 207, 210
(1996) (citing State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 215 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1073
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(1989)); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 205-06 (1987) (whether judge's involvement in
defendant's case requires disqualification from further participation is left to sound
discretion of trial judge). In reviewing a district court's decision denying disqualification,
the appellate court must consider whether the district court correctly perceived the issue
to be one of discretion, whether the court acted within the boundaries of that discretion
and consistent with applicable law, and whether the court reached its decision through
an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
In moving to disqualify Judge Stegner from sentencing him, Mr. Shackelford
identified the following facts that would prevent Judge Stegner from applying legal
standards to his case in a fair and impartial manner: (1) Judge Stegner presided over
the criminal proceedings of Mr. Shackelford's co-defendants, Bernadette Lasater,
Martha Millar, Mary Abitz, and Sonja Abitz (Sonja); (2) During Sonja sentencing, Judge
Stegner acknowledged Sonja's statements following her arrest was some of the most
incriminating testimony against Mr. Shackelford even though the statement was not
elicited at Mr. Shackelford's trial (27966/31928 Supplemental R. Vol.Ill, pp.500, 502
(State v. Sonja Abtiz, Latah County Case No. CR00-00263, Sentencing Tr., p.42, Ls.3-

11 ("[T]his statement [from Sonya Abitz, State's Exhibit 1 to her PSI] is some of the
most incriminating testimony ... against Dale Shackelford. It didn't come out at trial."));
and (3) having presided over Mr. Shackelford's 2001 sentencing, as well as the
sentencings of Mr. Shackelford's co-defendants, Judge Stegner had formed the opinion
that Mr. Shackelford manipulated, deceived, and coerced others to commit acts they
would not otherwise do. (R.39398, pp.64-66; 27966/31928 Supplemental R. Vol.Ill,
pp.500, 502 (State v. Lasater, Latah County Case No. CR00-00264, Sentencing Tr.,
p.29, Ls.22-24).)
10

Judge Stegner also considered and was exposed to numerous statements
constituting testimonial hearsay that were not subject to cross-examination in violation
of Mr. Shackelford's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. (R.39398, p.67;
27966/31928 Supplemental R. Vol.Ill, pp.500, 502 (State v. Sonja Abtiz, Latah County
Case No. CR00-00263, Sentencing Tr., p.42, Ls.3-11 ).) In addition, Judge Stegner was
privy to the confidential and privileged trial notes of defense counsel that were disclosed
to the judge during post-conviction proceedings for an in-camera determination of
whether the notes should be provided to the State. (R.39398, p.68; 27966/31928
Supplemental R.,

pp.

120,

137-38) Finally,

Judge Stegner was exposed to

impermissible and inflammatory victim impact statements in the original PSI, including
recommendations from Fred Palahniuk's brother and son that Mr. Shackelford be
sentenced to death. (R.39398, pp.69-70; R.27966,

PSI, pp.5-6.) In sum, the

overwhelming volume and nature of Judge Stegner's exposure to impermissible,
inflammatory and prejudicial information about Mr. Shackelford would make it
impossible for him to fairly and impartially sentence Mr. Shackelford.
In denying the disqualification motion, the court acknowledged having reviewed
the information cited by counsel but concluded Crawford did not apply to sentencing
evidence, and if the court had been prejudiced against Mr. Shackelford, it would not
have vacated his two death sentences. (39398 Tr., p.26, Ls.17-24.) The court
acknowledged reviewing defense counsel's notes in post-conviction proceedings, but
stated that it had "probably forgotten more about this case than I knew at one time."
(39398 Tr., p.27, Ls.6-20.)
The circumstances of this case are not unlike those in State v. Lankford, 127
Idaho 608 (1995). In Lankford, the defendant agreed to cooperate with the State in the
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prosecution of his brother; in exchange, the State agreed not to seek death and to
recommend an indeterminate life sentence. Id. at 612-13. Despite the State's
agreement and written notice that it would not seek death, the district court imposed a
death sentence. Id. at 612. The defendant successfully challenged his sentence on
appeal and the matter was set for a new sentencing. Id. On the defendant's motion, the
original sentencing judge was disqualified and at the county prosecutor's request, the
attorney general's office was appointed to prosecute the case. Id. Thereafter, the
prosecutor filed notice of intent to seek death. Id. The defendant moved to strike the
State's notice based on the prior plea agreement. Id. The district court reviewed the
record and findings of the prior judge, including the State's indeterminate life sentence
recommendations in exchange for the defendant's cooperation, which the defendant
had already provided. Id. The district court found the agreement to be enforceable at
the resentencing and found the defendant had made a sufficient showing of
vindictiveness in seeking the death penalty, which the State had failed to rebut. Id. at
613. Although the district court struck the notice, it concluded the State could still
present evidence in aggravation under the agreement, which did not preclude the court
from imposing a death sentence. Id. At the sentencing hearing, the state presented
evidence in aggravation and the court found statutory aggravating circumstances, but
concluded none outweighed the mitigation, and imposed two consecutive fixed life
sentences. Id.
On appeal, the defendant argued he was entitled either to sentencing by a judge
untainted by the State's request for the death penalty, or to the appellate court's
imposition of the State's original sentencing recommendation.

Id. at 615. The Idaho

Supreme Court rejected the latter suggestion, but recognized other cases where the
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prosecution had made a harsher sentencing recommendation than it had agreed to in a
plea agreement, causing the cases to be remanded either for specific performance or
withdrawal of the guilty plea. Id. at 616. Where specific performance was the remedy
sought, it included resentencing by a different judge.

Id. at 616 (citing Santobel/o v.

New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971) (describing specific performance to include

sentencing by a different judge); State v. Persak, 847 P.2d 280, 282 (Mont.1993)
(upholding

order for

resentencing

before

a judge

untainted

by the

State's

recommendation outside the plea agreement); Stone v. Cupp, 592 P.2d 1044, 1046
(Or. App. 1979) (when State breached plea agreement sentencing recommendation,
case remanded for sentencing before a different judge where State makes a
recommendation consistent with plea agreement)).
The Lankford Court found the defendant's case distinguishable because the
impropriety of the State's death notice was discovered before sentencing occurred. Id.
Nevertheless, because the district court allowed the State to present aggravating
evidence, thus taking a position inconsistent with the plea agreement, the presentation
of such evidence by the State was erroneous, requiring the defendant's sentences to be
vacated. Id. at 617. On remand,
[s]o there can be no suggestion that the sentence ultimately imposed on
remand, whatever it may be, is in any way a product of the residual effects
of the state's submission of aggravating evidence and arguments,
resentencing shall be by a judge who has not heard the evidence or
arguments.
Id. at 618.

Although the State did not breach a plea agreement in Mr. Shackelford's case,
the State did submit notice of its intent not to seek a death sentence to the same judge
who had already sentenced Mr. Shackelford to death following a lengthy penalty phase
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sentencing trial in 2001. (27966 Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.960, L.9; R.27966, pp.3082-3115.)
Once the State submitted notice of its intent not to seek death again, the district court
should have disqualified itself from presiding over the resentencing based on its prior
knowledge of the sought punishment, the evidence it found to support the sought
punishment, and its actual imposition of death.
The district court abused its discretion and denied Mr. Shackelford Due Process
when it refused to disqualify itself and instead proceeded to sentence Mr. Shackelford.
This Court should vacate Mr. Shackelford's sentences and remand his case for
resentencing before a judge who has not been exposed to the prejudicial sentencing
information about Mr. Shackelford.

II.

The District Court Erred In Considering Testimony Not Subject To Confrontation And
Cross-Examination In Sentencing Mr. Shackelford
A. Introduction

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .
. . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]" U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis
added). The historical background against which the text of the Sixth Amendment was
drafted and adopted makes clear criminal prosecutions include more than the guilt
phase of a trial, embracing sentencing within the purview of the right to confront and
cross-examine. As a result, testimony offered by the State in support of two fixed life
sentences was subject to the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and crossexamination, and the district court's refusal to require such protections was error
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requiring Mr. Shackelford's sentences be vacated and his case remanded for
resentencing before a different judge.
B. Standard of Review
Constitutional questions are questions of pure law, and therefore are reviewed de
nova by this Court. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67 (2001).

C. The District Court Erred In Considering Testimony Not Subject To Confrontation
And Cross-Examination In Sentencing Mr. Shackelford To Two Fixed Life
Sentences
At the urging of the prosecutor, the district court sentenced Mr. Shackelford to
two fixed life sentences after having reviewed, inter alia, statements from the assistant
prosecuting attorney from Madison County, Missouri, R. Scott Killen, a statement from
Bernadette Lasater which

included correspondence between Ms.

Lasater and

Mr. Shackelford, and a statement from Martha Millar, all of which were attached to the
UPSI. (39398 Tr., p.69, L.13 - p.72, L.18.) These statements were created and
submitted at the prosecutor's request, and were not a product of the presentence
investigator's efforts. (39398 Tr., p.48, Ls.5-22.) Ms. Lasater and Ms. Miller were
Mr. Shackelford's co-conspirators for the underlying offense of conspiracy to commit
murder. Neither of their statements, nor the statements of the Missouri prosecutor, were
subject to cross-examination as none of the witnesses appeared in person at
Mr. Shackelford's sentencing, despite Mr. Shackelford's objection to the district court's
consideration of the letters and statements on Sixth Amendment Confrontation grounds.
(R.39398, p.90.)
The Sixth Amendment requires any testimony submitted by the State in support
of a fixed sentence greater than the minimum be presented in open court and subject to
the crucible of cross-examination.
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1. The Plain Language Of The Sixth Amendment, Considered In Its Historical
Context, Demonstrates The Framers' Intent That The Right To Confrontation
Extend to Sentencing
By its plain language, considered in light of the history surrounding its ratification,
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution defines the scope of the right to
confront witnesses to include sentencing or punishment. The Sixth Amendment
provides that
[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process of obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
The only provisions of the Sixth Amendment which are subject to application in
all criminal prosecutions are the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, the right to confront witnesses, the right to compel favorable witnesses to
appear, and the right to counsel. The remaining provisions are, by the language of the
amendment, limited to trial, i.e., the right to a speedy, public trial, not a speedy, public
criminal prosecution.
At the time the Sixth Amendment was ratified by the states, "criminal
prosecution" had a historical meaning far broader than the means by which charges
were formally brought against an individual. At common law, Sir William Blackstone
characterized "criminal prosecution" as the "regular and ordinary method of proceeding
in the courts of the criminal jurisdiction" under
twelve general heads, following each other in a progressive order, viz: 1.
Arrest; 2.Commitment, and bail; 3. Prosecution; 4. Process; 5.
Arraignment, and its incidents; 6. Plea, and issues; 7. Trial, and

16

conviction; 8. Clergy; 9. Judgment, and its consequences; 10. Reversal of
judgment; 11. Reprieve, or pardon; 12. Execution ....
4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 288, 288-406 (1765-1769)
(hereinafter BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES); id. at 375 ("We are now to consider the next

stage of criminal prosecution, after trial and conviction are past, in such crimes and
misdemeanors as are either too high or too low to be included within the benefit of
clergy: which is that of judgment."). When imposing judgment as part of the criminal
prosecution, "the court must pronounce that judgment which the law hath annexed to
the crime, and which hath been constantly mentioned, together with the crime itself, in
some or other of the former chapters." 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES at 376.
At common law, a distinction was drawn between a conviction and judgment,
particularly because the disabilities associated with a criminal conviction did not attach
until judgment was rendered. Prior to the entry of judgment, the potential consequences
flowing from a conviction could still be avoided .
. . . for there is great difference between a man convicted and attainted:
though they are frequently through inaccuracy confounded together. After
conviction only a man is liable to none of these disabilities; for there is still
in contemplation of law a possibility of his innocence. Something may be
offered in arrest of judgment; the indictment may be erroneous, which will
render his guilt uncertain, and thereupon the present conviction may be
quashed: he may obtained a pardon, or be allowed the benefit of clergy:
both which suppose some latent sparks of merit, which plead in
extenuation of his fault. But when judgment is once pronounced, both law
and fact conspire to prove him completely guilty; and there is not the
remotely possibility left of anything to be said in his favour.
4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES at 380-81. "There now remains nothing to speak of but
execution; the completion of human punishment." Id. at 403. "[H]aving thus arrived at

the last stage of criminal proceedings, or execution, the end and completion of human
punishment, which was the sixth and last head to be considered under the division of
public wrongs, the fourth and last object of the laws of England[.]" Id. at 406. Thus, at
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the time the Sixth Amendment was drafted and ratified, the common law understanding
of "criminal prosecutions" included sentencing. See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16 (Washington, D.C. 1931)
(restating the essentials of a criminal proceeding to include sentencing); Commonwealth
v. Duane, 1 Binn. 601 (Pa. 1809) (Act prohibiting "prosecution by indictment" for a

common law offense from date of the Act's passage and thereafter, ends the
prosecution of one who was tried and found guilty prior to the Act's passage because
the judgment is part of the prosecution by indictment).
In addition, by the time the Sixth Amendment was drafted and ratified by the
States, individual states had already drafted and adopted their own constitutions, a
majority of which included a confrontation clause. 2 The right of a person in a capital or
criminal prosecution to confront his accuser or witnesses against him was included in
the overwhelming majority of state constitutions. See Bill Schwartz, 1 THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 235

(1971) (hereinafter Schwartz) (Virginia

Declaration of Rights, art. 8 ("That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a
right . . . to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses . . . . ")); id. at 265
(Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, art. IX ('That in all prosecutions for criminal
offences, a man hath a right ... to be confronted with the witnesses, to call for evidence
in his favour . . . . ")); id. at 278 (Delaware Declaration of Rights, § 14 ("That in all
prosecutions for criminal offences, every man hath a right ... to be confronted with the
accusers or witnesses .... ")); id. at 282 (Maryland Declaration of Rights, art. XIX

2

The enforcement of the right to confrontation in colonial America is not surprising
given that the right to confront one's accusers "dates back to Roman times." Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004). As a result, the right to confrontation was part and
parcel of the common law brought from England. Id.
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("That, in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to be confronted with
witnesses against him .... ")); id. at 287 (North Carolina Declaration of Rights, art. VII
("That, in all criminal prosecutions, every man has a right ... to confront the accusers
and witnesses with other testimony .... ")); id. at 323 (Vermont Declaration of Rights,
Ch.I, art. X ("That, in all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses ... ."));id. at 342, 371 (Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights, Ch. 1, art. XII ("And every subject shall have a right ... to meet the witnesses
against him face to face .... ")); id. at 377 (New Hampshire Bill of Rights, art. XV ("And
every subject shall have a right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face ...
.").
Other states' constitutions included provisions that could be argued implicitly
included protection of the right to confrontation. 3 Id. at 260 (New Jersey Const. art. XVI
('That all criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of witnesses and counsel,
as their prosecutors are or shall be entitled to.")); id. at 298 (Georgia Constitution, art.
XLI ("The jury shall be judges of law, as well as of fact .... ")); id. at 311 (New York
Constitution, art. XXXV ("[S)uch parts of the common law of England, and of the statute
law of England and Great Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New
York, as together did form the law the said colony on [April 19, 1775) shall be and
continue the law of this State .... ")).
Considering the plain language of the Sixth Amendment, the historical context in
which it was ratified by the states, as well as the express inclusion of the right to
confrontation in a majority of state constitutions, it is clear the right to confrontation was

3

Only two state constitutions were completely silent on the issue of confrontation.
Schwartz, supra, at 325-36 (South Carolina); id. at 289-90 (Connecticut Declaration of
Rights, art. 1 (readopting its colonial charter)).
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considered an indispensible right both in colonial and post-revolutionary America.
Moreover, because most colonies had recognized the right to confrontation before the
Revolution and before they had adopted their own constitutions containing an explicit
confrontation guarantee, colonial America's experience with criminal prosecutions
informed what was understood by the Sixth Amendment guarantee of confrontation.
Based on its analysis of the history of confrontation, both at common law and
early post-revolutionary America, the United States Supreme Court reached two
conclusions about the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation: first, it was directed at
the principal evil of using ex parte examinations as evidence against an accused, i.e.,
testimonial hearsay; and second, "the Framers would not have allowed admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for crossexamination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-54 (2004).
A substantial reason for the Framers' adoption of the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation through in-person cross-examination stemmed from a healthy distrust of
judges and other government officials.
We have no doubt that the courts below were acting in utmost good faith
when they found reliability. The Framers, however, would not have been
content to indulge in this assumption. They knew that judges, like other
government officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of
the people; the likes of the dread Lord Jeffreys were not yet too distant a
memory. They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67 (citations omitted).

Although acknowledging it was leaving open the question of what constituted a
testimonial statement, the Court found that at a minimum, it applied to prior testimony at
a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and statements elicited
during police interrogations. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Specifically, the Court held that
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the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause guaranteed a defendant the right to
confront those who bear testimony against him.

Id. at 51. The Crawford Court thus

established the framework for evaluating Confrontation Clause claims, determining as a
general matter the Confrontation Clause is "most naturally read as a reference to the
right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the
time of the founding." Id. at 54.

2. Because Punishment Often Automatically Attached Upon Conviction Of A
Serious Offense In Colonial America, The Right To Confrontation That Attached
To Trial Attached To Sentencing By Default
Prior to and during the time of our Nation's founding, crime and punishment were
matters generally handled by each of the colonies; there was no federal government,
only the British Parliament and Crown and the officials who were beholden to them.
Over time, the colonists came to resent and distrust the Crown, which was perceived to
be tyrannical in its governance of the colonies. See Bernard Schwartz, 1 THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 49-52, 199 (1971) (noting that had the mother country
continued to treat the colonies with "a wise and salutary neglect," rather than asserting
imperial power after the end of the French and Indian War, the United States may not
have come to be); NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 23 (Washington D.C. 1931) ("America was colonized by
Englishmen who had had a bad experience of seventeenth-century English legislation
and seventeenth-century law enforcement under the Stuarts, and had been taught to
think of the jury as standing between them and royal tyranny. Again, on the eve of the
Revolution, the local jury in more than one colony was a safeguard against enforcement
of obnoxious legislation by royal governors.").
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The colonists' distrust of government officials extended not only to governors and
political leaders under the control of the Crown, but also to judges who were perceived
to be inextricably intertwined with the interests of England and the Crown, not the
colonists. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968); see also Resolution of the
Continental Congress, October 19, 1765 (declaration to "His Majesty's Person and
Government" of the essential rights and liberties of the colonists, including "[t]hat Trial
by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies,"
and maintaining that Stamp Act duties, as well as other duties, and the extension of
jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts beyond its ancient limits subverted the rights and
liberties of colonists) (available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/resolu65.asp);
Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, October 14, 1774 ("And
whereas ... judges, who before held only estates at will in their office, have been made
dependant on the crown alone for their salaries ... And whereas it has lately been
resolved in parliament, that by force of statute ... colonists may be transported to
England, and tried

there

upon accusations for treasons and misprisions,

or

concealments of treasons committed in the colonies, and by a late statute, such trials
have

been

directed

in

cases

therein

mentioned

.")

(available

at

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/resolves.asp); id. Resolution N.C.D. 5 ("That the
respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to
the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage,
according to the course of that law."); Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776
(objecting to the King making "judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries," to protecting armed British
troops from punishment for murders of the inhabitants of the state by mock trials, to
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depriving them in many cases of the benefits of trial by jury, and for transporting them
"beyond

seas

to

be

tried

for

pretended

offenses

.

. .

.")

(available

at

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/declare.asp).
The colonists were:
endowed with the two essentials of the English Constitution: A representative
legislative assembly and recognition of the basic rights of Englishmen. More
than that, the establishment of such essentials in written fundamental laws or
documents in the form of Charters granted from London had a profound
influence on American constitutional ideas .
. . . The charters received from London ... could be amended or revoked at
the will of the grantor. In law, they remained only medieval grants, subject to
the will of the grantor, though they regulated the lives and property of everincreasing thousands of Americans.
Schwartz, supra, at 50.
It was against this backdrop that the jury trial garnered both federal and state
protection through the United States Constitution and the constitutions of the individual
states.
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal
defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government. Those who
wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was
necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to
eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of
higher authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to create an
independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary
action. Proving an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the
defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more
tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was
to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State
Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official
power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of
the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power,
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found
expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence. The deep
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commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious cases as a
defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must
therefore be respect by the States.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S 145, 155-56 (1968) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

It is clear that even before the founding of our nation, our forefathers regarded
the jury as a bulwark against an oppressive government, including judges. The
development and acknowledgement of our Nation's and forefathers' respect for the
incontrovertible right of an accused to place his fate in the hands of a jury of his peers,
in the vicinage of the offense, is integral to understanding why the right of confrontation
does not end at the guilty verdict's doorstep.
[T]hese several stages [of criminal prosecution] have developed and taken
shape along with a system of constitutional guaranties and mitigating
devices, chiefly as protections to accused persons, and as a result of
contests between the courts and the Crown in Stuart England at the time
of colonization, when we took over English institutions. But they developed
and took shape, also, with reference to a time when all serious crimes
were punishable with death.

It is worth while to note some of the reasons for the extravagant
powers of criminal juries in so many of the States. Colonial tribunals were
largely manned by laymen and lay judges obtained in some States till well
into the nineteenth century. There was no substantial difference in
training, competence, experience, or intelligence between judges and jury.
Also the colonists had had a bad experience of judges in the political and
religious prosecutions in the nadir of English justice under the Stuarts. In
some colonies there had been a bad experience of royal judges, and after
the Federal Constitution there was a bad experience of masterful
federalist judges.
NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

18, 27 (Washington D.C. 1931).
Jury sentencing, once common in American courts, has been
condemned by every national crime commission and major sentencinglaw reform study since 1930.
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The original reasons for jury sentencing in America included
colonial distrust of judges appointed by the Crown, a democratic faith in
citizen involvement in the justice system, and the general lack of
differences in training and competence between the judge and the jury
during much of the nineteenth century.
Sanford H. Kadish, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1465 (N.Y. The Free Press
1983); see also Note: Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM.

L. REV. 1134, 1155-56 (1960) ("At common law, sanctions were assessed by the court
in all cases and jury sentencing in this country is said to be a reaction to the harsh
penalties imposed by royal judges in England in the colonies, and the early distrust of
government power. The practice was further supported by the lack of substantial
difference in training, competence, or intelligence between colonial judges and juries.").
That jury sentencing in serious criminal cases was either de facto or explicitly the
rule, not the exception, at the birth of our nation has been acknowledged by the
Supreme Court:
Thus, with respect to the criminal law of felonious conduct, "the English
trial judge of the later eighteenth century had very little explicit discretion in
sentencing. The substantive criminal law tended to be sanction-specific; it
prescribed a particular sentence for each offense. The judge was meant
simply to impose that sentence (unless he thought in the circumstances
that the sentence was so inappropriate that he should invoke the pardon
process to commute it)." Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the
Eve of the French Revolution, in The Trial Jury in England, France,
Germany 1700-1900, pp. 36-37 (A. Schiappa ed.1987). As Blackstone,
among many others, has made clear, "[t]he judgment, though pronounced
or awarded by the judges, is not their determination or sentence, but the
determination and sentence of the law." 3 Blackstone 396 (emphasis
deleted).

As in Williams [v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)], our periodic recognition
of judges' broad discretion in sentencing-since the 19th-century shift in this
country from statutes providing fixed-term sentences to those providing
judges discretion within a permissible range, Note, The Admissibility of
Character Evidence i'n Determining Sentence, 9 U. Chi. L.Rev. 715
(1942)-has been regularly accompanied by the qualification that that
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discretion was bound by the range of sentencing options prescribed by the
legislature. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct.
589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972) (agreeing that "[t]he Government is also on
solid ground in asserting that a sentence imposed by a federal district
judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review"
(emphasis added)); Williams, 337 U.S., at 246, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079
(explaining that, in contrast to the guilt stage of trial, the judge's task in
sentencing is to determine, "within fixed statutory or constitutional limits[,]
the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt" has been
resolved).
The historic link between verdict and judgment and the consistent
limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the legal
penalties provided highlight the novelty of a legislative scheme that
removes the jury from the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes
the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would
receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict
alone.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479-80, 481-83 (2000); accord Deborah Young,
Fact-Finding at Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the Rules, 79 CORNELL L.

REV. 199, 306-36 (1994); cf. 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES at 238 (recognizing that
juries often mitigated a defendant's punishment for theft, which under common law and
throughout Europe was death for anything valued at twelvepence or more, by finding
him guilty of theft of less than twelvepence, and characterizing the juries' actions as
"pious perjury").
Many commentators and scholars have similarly recognized the historical role
juries played in determining sentences in criminal cases.
In colonial times, and particularly in the period before American
independence, juries were de facto sentencers with substantial power.
Many crimes were capital offenses. The result was binary--guilty and
death, or not guilty and freedom. There were few scalable punishments, or
punishments involving a term of years. This is so because penitentiaries
were not common until the end of the eighteenth century. Jurors plainly
understood the impact of a guilty verdict on the defendant because of the
relative simplicity of the criminal law and its penalty structure, and often
because of the process by which they were selected. They were picked
from the rolls of white men with property. Indeed, steps were sometimes
taken to secure better qualified people to serve on juries. Juries were
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hardly representative in the sense that we understand today. The
substantive criminal law was the province of the states, and was, for the
most part, state common law, often deriving from cases with which the
jurors were familiar.
Like the modern jury, colonial jurors were authorized to give a general
verdict without explanation, but unlike the modern jury, the colonial jury
was explicitly permitted to find both the facts and the law. If capital
punishment were inappropriate, they would simply decline to find guilt, or
find the defendant guilty of a lesser crime in order to avoid the penalty of
death. No one disparaged this as "jury nullification." Ignoring the law to
effect a more lenient outcome was well within the jury's role. In fact,
several colonies explicitly provided for jury sentencing.
Thus, in the colonial division of labor, juries had a preeminent role. There
was no need for a priori punishment standards or rules, because there
was, for the most part, a single punishment. Penal philosophy, at least as
a formal matter, was retributive. There was little national federal law, even
after independence. Most criminal law derived from the common law and
in time, statutes from state legislatures--law with which jurors were
familiar.

The turn of the nineteenth century brought scalable punishments-penitentiaries and, in time, reformatories--and thus, a more complex set of
sentencing outcomes. The jury could no longer link conviction to a
particular sentence even if it had the power to sentence or decide
questions of law--and it did not. Now, they were explicitly instructed to find
only the facts; judges determined the applicable law. Federal substantive
criminal law began to evolve, although most criminal prosecutions were
still state-based. And the jury changed: it was more diverse as barriers to
serving as jurors were lifted for minorities and women, as were property
restrictions. With more and more access to education, a professional class
of judges and lawyers evolved, and with it, the power of the jury declined,
including the power to affect the sentence.
Over time, a different division of labor evolved as between judges and
juries: juries decided liability; judges sentenced. Selection procedures
sought to insure that the jury would be selected in direct proportion to what
they did not know about the issues, or the parties. And that was not too
difficult in an urbanizing, diverse country. Juries became more and more
passive, deferring to the professional judge.
Judge Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too
Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 692-95 (2010) (footnotes
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omitted); Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 455 (1996) (footnotes omitted) (although acknowledging the
dearth of research on the topic, recognizing what is known shows "early colonial juries
had authority to indirectly determine sentencing much as the early English jury did.
Furthermore, some colonies conferred on juries greater authority to indirectly determine
sentences in criminal cases explicitly. Even toward the middle of the twentieth century,
state statutes authorized juries to determine sentencing in capital and non-capital
cases. Thus, as in England, the American jury frequently played a broader role in the
trial process by determining criminal sanction and as well as issues of guilt or
innocence."); Young, State v. Persak, 256 Mont. 404, 847 P.2d 280, 305 (1993).
While the role of the jury in sentencing and punishment decisions has
unquestionably diminished over time to the comparatively anemic role it holds today, the
jury played a prominent role in sentencing and punishment in the colonies and States
early in our Nation's history.

WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIM. PROC. § 1.6(8) (3d. ed.

2011.) To mitigate harsh punishments, grand jurors would often downgrade charges to
non-capital offenses, and juries would convict of lesser offenses, having full knowledge
of the penalties designated for the charged and lesser offenses. Id.; Young, supra, at
306-07. Thus, in matters of punishment and sentencing during colonial times and our
nation's founding, juries exercised real power while judges imposed sentences
predetermined either by the guilt phase verdict or by juries, engaging in a predominantly
ministerial function in sentencing. Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466, 478-80

(2000) (recognizing in felony cases that judges did not determine sentences at common
law, but simply imposed the sentence attached to the particular offense, while juries
acquitted or found a defendant guilty of a lesser offense to mitigate punishment).
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Where punishment was either inherent in a verdict or was determined by a jury,
the right to confrontation in colonial times and at our Nation's founding necessarily
extended to sentencing. It is undisputed that from colonial times through the present
day, excluding a brief flirtation with judicial reliability determinations in lieu of
confrontation, 4 an accused in this country has always had the right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him in a criminal trial. Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 42-60 (2004) (documenting common law, colonial and post-revolutionary
history of the right to confrontation and asserting Supreme Court case law has been
"faithful to the Framer's understanding:

[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent

from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where
the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross examine." (footnote omitted)); Motes
v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 ( 1900) (stating the Constitution "must control the

action of the courts of the United States in all criminal prosecutions before them," and
holding the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to be confronted with witnesses
against him prohibits the United States from using a deposition or statement of an
absent witness against the accused at trial).

In pre- and post-revolutionary America,

where punishment was either inherent in the verdict or decided by juries based on the
evidence presented during the criminal trial, the right to confrontation inherently
extended to sentencing for serious offenses.
3. Separating Sentencing Proceedings From The Criminal Trial. The Declining Role
Of Juries, And The Changing Purposes Of Sentencing Did Not And Could Not
Abrogate The Constitutional Right To Confrontation At Sentencing

4

See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
not violated by admission of unavailable witness's statement against an accused so
long as the court determines the statement bears sufficient "indicia of reliability"),
overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

29

The power of juries in pre- and post-revolutionary America was not only evident
in its inherent sentencing authority, but also in its substantive authority in the criminal
law arena. Early on in our Nation's history, juries had the power, if not the right, to
determine both the law and the facts in criminal cases, often disregarding instructions
from judges. Compare Douglas G. Smith, the Historical and Constitutional Contexts of

Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 446-454 (1996) (concluding that "in the early
years of the Republic, the jury was recognized as possessing the power to judge both
issues of law as well as issues of fact," but this power disappeared as the legal system
changed from a layman's practice to that of professionals learned in the law), and Mark
DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939)
(cataloging cases reflecting that in our Nation's first fifty years, jurors had the power to
decide both law and facts, and noting the current trend of depriving jurors of the power
to decide the law was contrary to state statutes and state constitutional provisions), and

Bushel/'s Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670) (after jury acquitted William Penn of
unlawful assembly, despite evidence of his guilt, jurors were fined for disregarding the
court's instructions and "overwhelming evidence" that should have resulted in guilt; juror
who refused to pay the fine was sent to prison, and on appeal, the court held jurors
could not be punished by judges for their verdicts, but could be liable for attaint,
whereby a second jury could convict and punish the first jury for rendering a false
verdict), with Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry Into the Right of Criminal Juries to
Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 11 (1998)
(arguing the historical evidence does not support the claim that jurors had the right to
decide the law, although acknowledging they may have had the power to do so). By
1851, nine states had declared either by constitution or statute that juries had the right
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to decide questions of law, while jurors in six additional states had established either
through judicial decision or practice that juries had the power to do so. Albert W.
Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 867, 903-916 (1994).
Who would and should decide the law and who would decide fact became a
power struggle between jurors and judges. Not surprisingly, most courts passing on the
question decided judges, not jurors, should settle questions of law. Id. at 910 (identifying
courts in eleven states which had rejected the right of jurors to decide the law between
1850 and 1931 ). The power struggle between judges and juries on questions of law
ended with the United States Supreme Court decision in Spart v. United States, 156
U.S. 51 (1895). In Spart, the Court held jurors are bound by a judge's instructions
regarding the law but jurors are the exclusive judges of facts, rejecting the principle that
jurors had the right and power to decide both. Id. at 106-07. Resolution of the struggle
between juries and judges in deciding questions of law was but one of the ways in
which the historical power of juries was diminished in favor of the judiciary. Another was
sentencing.
Over time, as definite punishments were divorced from serious offenses,
sentencing took on a life of its own and became increasingly important. Beginning in the
late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries, fixed punishments for serious offenses
declined as state legislatures began adopting provisions that allowed for the imposition
of sentences within a particular range set by the legislature. Nancy King & Susan Klein,
Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1509-10 (2001); WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL, 1
CRIM. PROC. § 1.6(c) (3d. ed. 2011) (noting the post-revolutionary period marked the
beginning of a universal restructuring of sanctions, originating in Pennsylvania, by which
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capital and corporal punishment were sharply reduced in favor of incarceration at a
penitentiary for a period of time determined by a judge, or jury, within legislatively
prescribed

limits).

The

movement away from

determinate sentencing

toward

indeterminate sentencing by a judge within legislatively established ranges was, in large
part, due to the recognition that death and corporal punishment were disproportionate
penalties which had little deterrent effect. Benjamin C. McMurray, Challenging Untested
Facts at Sentencing: The Applicability of Crawford at Sentencing After Booker, 37

MCGEORGE L. REV. 589, 592 & nn.11-15 (2006); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 481 U.S. 466,
478-83 (2000). At the same time, indeterminate sentencing was driven by a new focus
on the sentencing goals of rehabilitation and reformation, rather than retribution.
Gertner, supra, at 424-25; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). With
rehabilitative goals in mind, the separation of conviction and sentencing became
entrenched during the Progressive era in response to our deep uncertainty
regarding free will. At trial the jury would determine guilt or innocence
according to traditional, generally accepted notions of personal
responsibility. At the sentencing phase, however, judges were to consider
more individualized, explanatory, or mitigating factors such as the
"defendant's background, upbringing, associates and so on---matters
rarely formally admissible during the trial---became relevant."
Sherman Clark, The Courage of our Convictions, 97 MICH. L.REV. 2381, 2444 (1999)
(quoting Thomas A Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound:
An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915, 1926 (1995)).

Rather than fitting the crime, punishment came to fit the offender. As sentencing
became individualized, the fate of an offender came to be seen more as a medical
problem for specialists or experts, such as criminologists, psychologists, and judges to
solve, not lay jurors. King & Klein, supra, at 1509-11; Comment, Consideration of
Punishment by Juries, 17 U. CHl.l.REV. 400, 406 n.1 (1949) (concluding individualized
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punishment is a problem for specialists, not a body representing a cross-section of the
community, but recognizing statutes in thirteen states giving jurors absolute sentencing
discretion within specified limits, and twenty-five different statutes which gave juries the
right to decide between two specified penalties in certain cases); Gertner, supra, at 42425.
With

rehabilitation

and

reformation

as the

backdrop,

judges took into

consideration a broad range of factors for the purpose of fixing a "more enlightened and
just sentence." Williams, 337 U.S. at 250-51. Judges were provided with a tremendous
amount of information about an offender---far greater than anything presented during
the guilt phase of a trial---which was not subject to strict evidentiary procedural limits.
Id. at 246. The belief was that "by careful study of the lives and personalities of

convicted offenders many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to
complete freedom and useful citizenship." Id. at 249. Inherent in this belief was the
notion that punishment would be less severe, not more severe by access to this
information, and that probation agents creating presentence investigation reports
containing testimonial hearsay "ha[d] not been trained to prosecute but to aid
offenders." Id. at 249-50. It was by this reasoning that the Williams Court concluded the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not limit judges to only that
information received in open court to impose sentence. Id. at 251. Although the Court
acknowledged its prior precedent established the underlying philosophy of the Due
Process Clause was to ensure no person was tried and convicted unless given
reasonable notice of the charges against him, afforded an opportunity to examine
adverse witnesses, offer evidence on his own behalf, and be represented by counsel,
the Court deemed these protections applicable only when the information was
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presented to determine a defendant's guilt. Id. at 245 (citing In re: Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
273 (1948); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)). The Court concluded that to
extend the Due Process Clause to require confrontation at sentencing "would hinder if
not preclude all courts-state and federal-from making progressive efforts to improve the
administration of justice." Id.
We must recognize that most of the information now relied upon by judges
to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be
unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by
witnesses subject to cross-examination. And the modern probation report
draws on information concerning every aspect of a defendant's life. The
type and extent of this information make totally impractical if not
impossible open court testimony with cross-examination. Such a
procedure could endlessly delay criminal administration in a retrial of
collateral issues.

Id. at 250 (footnote omitted). The Williams Court's elevation of concerns of efficiency
and practicality over constitutional guarantees is not a philosophy that is endorsed
today. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251 n.11 (1999) ("[l]t should go
without saying that, if such [state sentencing] policies conflict with safeguards enshrined
in the Constitution for the protection of the accused, those policies have to yield to the
constitutional guarantees."); cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("The founders of the American Republic were not prepared to
leave [criminal justice] to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the
least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has
always been free.").
Now that we have come full circle, and the overriding goal of sentencing is no
longer rehabilitation or reformation, but rather, the protection of society and punishment,
opening the floodgates at sentencing to evidence not subject to confrontation to
increase a defendant's fixed sentence cannot be countenanced or constitutionally
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justified. 5 See, e.g.,

State v. Draper, 151Idaho576, 599-600 (2011) (gravity of the

offense and need to protect society justified imposition of fixed life sentence upon child
who was sixteen at the time of his offense); State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 836
(2000) (primary objective of sentencing is protecting society and to achieve any or all of
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution); State v Moore, 78 Idaho 359,
363 (1956) (the good order and protection of society are the primary sentencing
considerations to which all other factors are subservient); State v. Toohil/, 103 Idaho
565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)(the reasonableness of a sentence is determined by whether it
is necessary to achieve the "primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given
case. A sentence of confinement longer than necessary for these purposes is
unreasonable.").
Because punishment for serious offenses was inherent in a guilt verdict in
colonial times, at our Nation's founding, and when the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause was ratified, the protections of the Confrontation Clause extended to sentencing
if not de jure, then de facto. Those witnesses who provided testimony against an
accused at trial were subject to confrontation through cross-examination. Simply
because the sentencing aspect of trial has been severed from the proceeding which
results in a guilty verdict, does not mean the constitutional right to Confrontation can be
denied at sentencing. The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applies to testimonial
evidence at sentencing, just as it applies to the determination of guilt.

5

That is not to say violation of the right to confrontation has ever been or could have
been justified. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged in the context of the right to
jury trial, different means of proceeding to trial are inevitably more convenient and
efficient than a jury trial, but delay and inconvenience are the price all free nations must
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4. The District Court's Imposition Of Two Fixed Life Sentences Upon
Mr. Shackelford Based On, Inter Alia, The Statements Of His Co-Defendants And
The Missouri Prosecutor Violated The Confrontation Clause And Was An Abuse
Of Discretion
The district court's consideration of statements from Ms. Lasater, Ms. Millar and
Sonja Abitz, Mr. Shackelford's co-defendants, as well as a letter from the then-Iron
County Prosecuting Attorney,

Scott Killen, for sentencing purposes, but over

Mr. Shackelford's objection, was an abuse of discretion. The statements were
testimonial and were not subject to cross-examination, despite Mr. Shackelford's
objection.
As different factual scenarios arose, the Supreme Court attempted to provide
guidance as to what was and was not meant by "testimonial" within the context of the
right to confrontation, relying heavily upon the text of the amendment itself, along with
common law and colonial practice, and its own prior decisions. Bui/coming v. New
Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (relying on Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305 (2009) to conclude the defendant was entitled under the Sixth Amendment to
confront and cross-examine the analyst who analyzed his blood and whose report was
relied upon by the State at trial; the State's offer of testimony through a surrogate who
did not conduct the analysis violated the Confrontation Clause); Michigan v. Bryant, 131
S Ct. 1143 (2011) (relying heavily on Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) to
conclude victim's statements to police identifying and describing his shooter were not
barred by the Confrontation Clause because circumstances objectively showed primary
purpose of interrogation of the victim was to enable the police to respond to an ongoing
emergency); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 305 (analyzing historical cases and applying

pay for their liberties in more substantial matters. 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES, at 34244 (cited with approval in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 246 (1999)).
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Crawford to hold the Confrontation Clause does not allow the prosecution to prove its

case through ex parte out-of-court affidavits by laboratory analysts); Giles v. California,
554 U.S. 353, 359-73 (2008) (reviewing text of confrontation clause and historical cases
addressing forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine as an exception to the Confrontation
Clause, which allowed unconfronted statements to be admitted against the defendant
where the defendant's acts were designed to keep the witness from testifying, and
denying to apply it in case where there was no finding of the defendant's intent to keep
the witness from testifying); Davis, 547 U.S. at

824 n.3, 825 (analyzing text of

confrontation clause and historical cases addressing what kinds of testimony it was
applicable to).
In Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, the Court explained that statements are nontestimonial
if made in the course of a police interrogation under circumstances objectively showing
the primary purpose of the interrogation was to allow police to meet an ongoing
emergency. When there is no such ongoing emergency and the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to prove or establish past events, which may be relevant to later criminal
proceedings, such statements are testimonial. Id. at 822.
Here, the statements of Ms. Lasater and Ms. Millar were clearly written at the
prosecutor's or PSI investigator's request, and were offered to prove or establish past
events that would be relevant to sentencing. (UPSI, 7/17/11 and 7/18/11 Letters to
Judge Stegner from Ms. Lasater (stating her belief about Mr. Shackelford's character,
his responsibility for her incarceration and conviction for rape, and her belief in his past,
current and future dangerousness); 7/25/11 Email "To Whom it may concern" from
Ms. Millar (noting her fears of Mr. Shackelford and her belief he will harm her, and
stating "I hope that this letter will help in the present proceeding against Dale
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Shackelford.").) Sonja Abitz's testimony and statement regarding Mr. Shackelford
prompted the district court to acknowledge "this statement [from Sonya Abitz, State's
Exhibit 1 to her PSI] is some of the most incriminating testimony ... against Dale
Shackelford. It didn't come out at trial." (Supplemental R. Vol.Ill, pp.500, 502 (State v.
Sonja Abitz, Latah County Case No. CR00-00263 Sentencing Tr., p. 42, Ls.3-11).).
Similarly, in his letter to the court, Mr. Killen explained his reasons for not pursuing
charges against Mr. Shackelford for Forcible Rape and Armed Criminal Action (charges
were brought but dismissed), Theft (charges never brought), and Conspiracy to commit
First Degree Murder in Missouri (charges never brought). Mr. Killen characterized
Mr. Shackelford as manipulative, a risk to public safety, and generally dangerous.
(UPSI, Prosecutor Killen's letter to Judge Stegner.)
Mr. Shackelford was not provided with an opportunity to confront these accusers
and cross-examine them, despite having objected to their letters and asserting his
constitutional right to confrontation. The district court did not address Mr. Shackelford's
objections but simply imposed sentence without specific reference to these letters;
however, the prosecutor specifically addressed the letters and emphasized them to the
district court in asking that fixed life sentences be imposed upon Mr. Shackelford,
sentences far greater than the statute calls for. l.C. § 18-4004 ("the court shall impose a
life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years ...
."). Obviously these letters and the statements contained therein are statements of past
events which were offered by the State to prove Mr. Shackelford is a dangerous man
from whom society must be protected, i.e., protection of society, the most important
sentencing consideration according to our courts. See, e.g., Draper, 151 Idaho at 599600 (gravity of the offense and need to protect society justified imposition of fixed life
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sentence upon child who was sixteen at the time of his offense); Lundquist, 134 Idaho at
836 (primary objective of sentencing is protecting society and to achieve any or all of
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution); Moore, 78 Idaho at 363 (the
good order and protection of society are the primary sentencing considerations to which
all other factors are subservient); Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568 (the reasonableness of a
sentence is determined by whether it is necessary to achieve the "primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case.").
Because the statements of Prosecutor Killen, Ms. Abitz, Ms. Lasater and
Ms. Millar were testimonial and were relied upon to impose two fixed life sentences, the
statements

violated

Mr.

Shackelford's

confrontation

rights.

As

a

result,

Mr. Shackelford's sentences must be vacated and his case remanded for sentencing
before a different judge not exposed to the testimonial statements, or Prosecutor Killen,
Ms. Abitz, Ms. Lasater and Ms. Millar should be required to appear at sentencing where
they can be confronted and subject to cross-examination by Mr. Shackelford.
D. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Shackelford was constitutionally entitled to
confront and cross-examine testimonial statements against him at sentencing. Despite
his objection, the district court permitted the testimonial statements of Ms. Lasater,
Ms. Millar, and Prosecutor Killen to be admitted without the benefit of confrontation, in
violation of Mr. Shackelford's Sixth Amendment rights. Under these circumstances, the
district court erred in permitting the unconfronted statements to be admitted against
Mr. Shackelford and relied upon by the prosecutor at sentencing, resulting in two fixed
life sentences. As a result, Mr. Shackelford's sentences must be vacated and his case
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remanded for resentencing where Ms. Millar, Ms. Lasater, Ms. Abitz and Mr. Killen will
be required to testify and be subject to cross-examination, or the State will not be
permitted to admit such testimonial statements.

II I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Considering Offenses Of Which
Mr. Shackelford Was Acquitted In Reaching Its Sentencing Decision
A.

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion by allowing admission and consideration

of crimes which Mr. Shackelford had been acquitted of at the time of sentencing, over
Mr. Shackelford's objection and without any offer of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence from the State. As a result, Mr. Shackelford is entitled to a new sentencing
where any evidence of prior offenses he was acquitted of committing is excluded unless
proven by the State by a preponderance of the evidence.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Considering Offenses Of Which
Mr. Shackelford Was Acquitted In Reaching Its Sentencing Decision
In the original PSI, the investigator reported Mr. Shackelford had been charged in

1985 with felonious use of a weapon in connection with the alleged rape of his eightyear-old stepdaughter, but was found not guilty of these offenses. The PSI investigator
also reported that Mr. Shackelford had been charged in 1988 with Attempted Escape
and Possession of a Weapon on the Premises of a Correctional Institution, based on
allegations that he had attempted to escape prison by prying the window and air vents
in his cell, but he was acquitted of those charges as well. Mr. Shackelford objected to
the inclusion of conduct and offenses of which he had been acquitted in the PSI and
consideration of the acquitted offenses at sentencing.
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(39387 R., p.92.) The district

court's refusal to strike these charges from the PSI, as well as the investigator's
explanation of the underlying conduct leading to the charges, was an abuse of
discretion where Mr. Shackelford objected to the information and the State did not prove
Mr. Shackelford had committed the offenses.
While the United States Supreme Court has permitted the admission of evidence
of an acquitted offense against a defendant at sentencing, the Court has required as a
threshold matter that the State prove the conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997). 6 Here, Mr. Shackelford objected to
the inclusion of his acquitted crimes in the PSI and objected to the district court's
consideration of his acquitted offenses in sentencing him. (39398 R., p.92; PSI, p.8.)
Despite his objections, the prior acquitted offenses were not stricken from the PSI and
the State did not seek to prove the crimes, or the underlying conduct supporting the
crimes, by a preponderance of the evidence. Watts, 519 U.S. at 155-57. Due to the
State's failure to prove the acquitted offenses, or the conduct underlying the offenses,
evidence of Mr. Shackelford's acquitted offenses should have been stricken from the
PSI and from consideration at sentencing. The district court's failure to do so entitles
Mr. Shackelford to a sentencing hearing before a different judge who has not been
exposed to this prejudicial and unreliable information.

IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Considering Impermissible Victim Impact
Evidence In Sentencing Mr. Shackelford
6

Notably the Court's decision in Watts addressed consideration of acquitted offenses
under the federal sentencing guidelines. The Watts decision preceded Apprendi, supra,
and permitted federal sentencing courts to consider acquitted offenses in sentencing
defendants under the guidelines, which rendered the acquitted offense a fact other than
a prior conviction, resulting in an increased sentence. Watts, 519 U.S. at 149-51. In

light of Apprendi, the continuing viability of Watts is debatable.
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A. Introduction

The district court abused its discretion in considering a victim impact letter from a
person who was not Mr. Shackelford's victim when imposing sentence.
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Considering Impermissible Victim
Impact Evidence In Sentencing Mr. Shackelford
The district court admitted and presumably considered a victim impact letter from
a person who was neither Mr. Shackelford's victim nor an immediate family member of
his victims. In doing so, the court abused its discretion by admitting and considering
such improper evidence when it sentenced Mr. Shackelford to serve the maximum
sentences it could impose: two fixed life sentences.
At sentencing, the court invited the State to present the statements of victims or
family members. (39398 Tr., p.36, L.23 - p.37, L.2.) After reporting none were present,
the prosecutor referred the court back to the family and victim statements from
Mr. Shackelford's PSI, as well as the UPSI. (39398 Tr., p.37, Ls.3-25.) Over
Mr. Shackelford's written objection, the statement of Suzanne Birrell Ninichuck was not
excluded from consideration at sentencing and was not stricken as an attachment to the
UPSI. (R.39398, UPSI, pp.2, 57-58.) Ms. Ninichuck was a friend of Donna Fontaine but
the two were not family members. (R.39398, UPSI, p.57.)
Idaho has adopted certain protections for crime victims at various stages of a
criminal prosecution, and has included within those protections immediate family
members of homicide victims. See Idaho Const. art. I, § 22; l.C. § 19-5306. Those
protections include the right of a crime victim or an immediate family member of a
homicide victim to be heard at sentencing proceedings, to be consulted during the
preparation of the PSI, and to "have included in that report a statement of the impact
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which the defendant's criminal conduct had upon the victim .... " l.C. § 19-5306 (1)(f),
(h). The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted section 19-5306's immediate family
member provision to include spouses, children, brothers, sisters, mothers and fathers,
and in-laws of the same degree of relation, i.e., mother-in-law, sister-in-law, daughter-inlaw. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575-76 (2008). Statements offered by persons who
are not immediate family members are inadmissible. Id.
"Whether a person is a victim under Idaho Code section 19-5306 is a factual
determination that is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho
367, 373-74 (2008). Appellate courts apply a three-part test to determine whether a
district court has abused its discretion: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted consistent with applicable legal
standards and within the outer bounds of its discretion; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 771
(2010).
Here, the district court's failure to explicitly exclude Ms. Ninichuck's statements
from its consideration at sentencing, despite Mr. Shackelford's objection, constituted an
abuse of discretion. Ms. Ninichuck was not Donna Fontaine's spouse, child, sister, or
mother, or an in-law of a similar degree of relation. Absent a recognized familial
relationship, her statement was inadmissible because she was neither a direct victim of
Mr. Shackelford's criminal conduct nor an immediate family member of a victim.
Although the district court did not explicitly reference Ms. Ninichuck's statement, or any
other for that matter, because Mr. Shackelford received a fixed life sentence in
connection with Ms. Fontaine's death, the maximum sentence he could possibly
receive, it cannot be said the statement had no impact on the sentence imposed. Thus,
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the inclusion and consideration of Ms. Ninichucks's statements in the court's sentencing
decision constituted an abuse of discretion, requiring Mr. Shackelford's sentence to be
vacated and his case remanded for resentencing before a different judge.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing Mr. Shackelford to serve two fixed life sentences. The district court also
erred in considering testimony that was not subject to confrontation in reaching its
sentencing decision. As a result, Mr. Shackelford's sentences must be vacated and his
case remanded for sentencing before a different judge.
DATED this 15th day of May, 2012.
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